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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

C a s e No^

1444g

:

-vsJAMES ELDON McNICOL, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant•

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant McNicol appeals from a jury verdict of
guilty of Criminal Homocide, Second Degree Murder, rendered
against him on January 5, 1976, in the District Court of
the Third Judicial District in and for Tooele County
before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the conviction affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 23, 1975, defendant and deceased were in
an apartment they shared in Pine Canyon, Tooele County,
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Utah (Ex, 2). Deceased was talking with the defendant,
he arose from the couch and grabbed her from behind,
holding one arm across her neck while putting his knee
in her back (Ex. 2 ) . Deceased then dropped to the floor.
Defendant left her on the floor and proceeded to listen
to the radio while lying on the couch.

When defendant

awoke, he realized deceased had in fact died.

He then

removed her clothes, put her in bed, and went in another
room to listen to the radio

(Ex. 2 ) .

The next day after drinking beer at the home
of a friend, defendant told his cousin that he had
killed the deceased.

Defendant then went to the

Sherifffs office in Tooele County and gave a four page
signed statement (Ex. 2) after signing a Waiver of
Rights Statement (Ex. P-l).
The Utah State Medical Examiner reported that
the deceased died of manual strangulation (R-28).
Defendant was thereafter charged with the crime
of criminal homocide, murder in the second degree, and
attorney Morris D. Young was appointed to represent him.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
REPRESENTATION BY APPOINTED COUNSEL MEASURED
UP TO THE REQUIRED STANDARD OF A COMPETENT MEMBER OF THE
BAR RENDERING REASONABLE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.
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Appellant sets forth a single point on appeal,
arguing that his representation by appointed counsel
on a charge of second degree murder was so ineffective
as not to measure up to reasonably effective assistance
rendered by a competent member of the Bar.

Appellant

bases his argument on several aspects of the conduct
of the trial, concluding that even though any one matter
in and of itself might not require a reversal, the
entire transcript presents a picture of a completely
inadequate defense.
As appellant correctly points out, the Utah
Supreme Court has enunciated in Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah
2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969) the test to be utilized
whenever the question of ineffective counsel is raised.
In Alires, the court first stated that the right of
an accused to counsel is included in the concept of due
process of law, embodied as it is in the United States
and Utah Constitutions.

The requirement of counsel, said

the court:
" . . . i s not satisfied by a
sham or pretense of an appearance in
the record by an attorney who manifests
no real concern about the interests
of the accused."
Immediately following the above quoted sentence
the court turns its attention to the standard required

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by due process to be applied to appointed counseel:
"The entitlement is to the assistance
of a competent member of the Bar, who
shows a willingness to identify himself
with the interests of the defendant and
present such defenses as are available
to him under the law and consistent
with the ethics of the profession."
Alires v. Turner, Id. at 121.
Appellant has quoted only the latter sentence from
Alires, supra.

However, respondent maintains that an

accurate analysis of the standard set forth in Alires
supra, requires a reading of the entire case and focusing
upon what the court says in regard to an attorney
manifesting real concern about the interests of the
accused.
As is pointed out in United States v. DeCoster,
487 F.2d 1197 (1973), cited by appellant, it is very
important to stress that the issue on any uneffective
counsel case is not the culpability of a lawyer, but
rather the constitutional rights of the accused.
Turning to the instant case, the trial record
reflects that the defendant McNicol was properly represented by counsel so as not to impair any of his constitutional rights.

McNicol exercised the right, through

counsel, to confront witnesses against him.

McNicol

exercised his right to take the witness stand on his
own behalf.

The defendant was granted a speedy trial

and a jury trial.
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I

of appellant's argument that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel could be a matter of trial
strategy again, appellant cannot argue that the trial
record is devoid of any showing of concern for his
interests by defense

counsel.

In Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 4 52 P.2d
323 (1969) the defendant claimed that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel based in part upon
the fact that his appointed attorney held only brief
conferences with him at the preliminary hearing and
before a plea was entered.

The court answered that

there is no inherent wrong in the fact that the conferences were of short duration.

The important factor

is what is done in the conference, not the time consumed
in doing it.

Certainly the length of the trial in

the instant case is not in and of itself conclusive
on the issue of ineffecitve counsel, as appellant
seems to argue.
The defendant in Strong v. Turner, also claimed
that he was coerced by his counsel into entering a guilty
plea to one charge based upon the promise of the prosecutor
to drop two other charges.

However, the court found that

there was ample evidence that defendant well understood
what he was doing and entered the plea voluntarily.
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Strong v, Turner court thus concluded that a review of
the record did not support defendant's claim that the
particular matters cited required granting of a writ
of habeas corpus based upon the claim of ineffective
counsel at trial.
Appellant herein aruges in his conclusion
that the entire trial record, read as a whole, reflects
a completely inadequate defense requiring reversal and a
new trial. Appellant thus urges the court to read
thoroughly the trial transcript in its entirety in the
case of State v. McNicol.
Respondent would join in this request to the court.
However, it is the belief of respondent that the record
as a whole measures up to the standard set forth in
Alires v. Turner; of reasonably effective assistance
rendered by a competent member of the Bar.
If the court should find that any of the
particulars raised by appellant herein do not measure
up to the above standard, one further question must be
asked.

The court must determine whether there is some

basis for believing that a better representation by counsel
would have been advantageous to appellant at trial.
As was said in Alires v. Turner;
"This is so because it is the
policy of our law established both by
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statute and decision that we do not
reverse for mere error or irregularity,
but only where it is substantial and
prejudicial." Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah
2d 118, at p. 120.
The particular matters cited by appellant as
evidence of ineffective representation by defense
counsel cannot be said, standing alone or as a whole,
to have had such an effect upon the result, appellant's
conviction of Second Degree Murder, as to require a new
trial.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the defense

attorney herein failed to object to leading questions,
failed to thoroughly cross-examine and failed to probe
any and all possible defenses;

that he failed to counter

adverse impressions left by prosecution witnesses, failed
to object to the admission of exhibits, and finally,
that he failed to object to Jury Instruction Number 11,
there is absolutely no rational reason to believe that
the verdict would have been different.
As to the failure of defense attorney to object
to Jury Instruction Number 11, defining the elements of
murder in the second degree, appellant argues that this
Instruction does not state that the jury may consider
lesser included offenses if the evidence fails to establish
one or more elements of the crime charged beyond a
reasonable doubt.

However, as appellant himself concedes,

Jury Instruction Number 12 explicitly defines the elements
of Manslaughter, and states that it is an included offense
of the Information.

Jury Instruction Number 13 proceeds
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to define the elements of Negligent Homocide, and also
describes it as an included offense of the Information.
Respondent respectfully argues that defense attorney
had no reason to object to Jury Instruction Number
11, since Jury Instructions 11, 12 and 13, read along
with the four verdicts submitted to the jury, clearly
and without equivocation inform the jury that Manslaughter and Negligent Homocide are lesser included
offenses of Second Degree Murder as charged on the
Information.
CONCLUSION
The record on appeal and the transcript in
State v. McNicol support respondent's contention that
appellant herein was given legal representation by
his appointed counsel which meausres up to the standard
set by the Utah Supreme Court.

Appellant's defense

attorney rendered reasonably effective assistance of
counsel as a competent member of the Bar.

None of the

matters cited by appellant in arguing that his representation was so ineffective as not to measure up to the
above cited standard, either standing alone or as a
whole, could be said to have had such an effect on the
verdict as to require reversal.
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Based upon the above
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cited authority and argument, respondent requests that
the verdict be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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